Friday, May 28, 2010

BREAKING!!! Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Refuses to Enforce Section 13. All S.13 cases halted

(See update at bottom)
In a ruling dated May 26, 2010, Tribunal Member Edward Lustig adjourned a Section 13 complaint file by the Canadian Jewish Congress against Henry Makow until a final decision in the Lemire case.


[8] I have reviewed the submissions of the parties and have concluded that it would be appropriate and would properly serve the interests of justice if this matter was adjourned. While the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, 1990 3 S.C.R. 892 that s. 13 (1) of the CHRA is constitutional, the application now before the Federal Court seeks to bring clarity to this issue in view of the distinct factual and legal context giving rise to this Tribunal's decision in Warman v. Lemire. Clearly Member Hadjis' decision goes beyond the consideration alone of the penalty provisions in s. 54 of the CHRA, as he chose not to "read out" the penalty provisions and preserve s. 13 of the CHRA. It is now up to the Federal Court to determine the operability of s. 13 of the CHRA. This will achieve the clarity that the Commission has indicated and that I agree is desirable in order to allow the Tribunal to be able to determine this and other cases brought under s. 13 of the CHRA.

[9] For these reasons I hereby adjourn these proceedings sine die pending the final outcome in the Warman v. Lemire case.

"Signed by"
Edward P. Lustig
OTTAWA, Ontario
May 26, 2010



What this decision means is that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has stopped holding hearings on alleged violations of Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.  Basically, enforcement of Section 13 has now stopped!

To understand how important today’s ruling was, here is a bit of background of censorship regime used by the “human rights” enforcers.

Canada’s Internet censorship legislation is broken up into two distinct parts. 

1.     Canadian Human Rights Commission
The first part is run by the fanatics at the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC).  They accept complaints from the public, investigate them and send them onto an “impartial” Tribunal to determine if the person actually violated the act.  (unless of course you’re a hate promoting friend of the CHRC, in which case, they toss out the complaint).  Only the CHRC can send a case to the Tribunal.  There is no direct access method.

2.     Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
The second part is a hearing before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT).  The Tribunal operates basically as a pseudo-court, and makes determinations on all issues before it.  The hearing process is sort of free wheeling and made up as they go along.  At the Tribunal basic human rights mean little.  For instance, Truth is No Defence – intent is no defence.  The complainant doesn’t even have to show up at his own hearing.

Think of it this way.  The CHRC are the prosecutors and the CHRT are court.

What today’s ruling means, is that the CHRC will continue on in their mission of fanatical censorship and totalitarianism, BUT when the CHRC refers a case to the Tribunal, the Tribunal will adjourn the case “sine die”, until a final decision is reached in the Lemire case.   That final decision might end up at the Supreme Court of Canada, and take up to 6 more years.

There is one other high profile case currently before the Tribunal. This is the case of B’nai Brith and Harry Abrams vs the Radical Press and Author Topham.  It is expected that a decision will be released shortly also adjourning this case “sine die” pending the final outcome of the Lemire case.

By stopping the Tribunal hearings, the CHRT has signaled that it will not be putting respondents through a lengthy meat grinder like prosecution at the behest of special interest groups.

The Tribunal member is this case was Edward Lustig.  He came to light in a recent ruling in the Ouwendyk case, where he slammed Serial complainant Richard Warman.

In his March 13, 2009 ruling Lustig found that:

“Moreover, it is possible that his activity in this regard, could have precipitated further hate messages in response. His explanation for including other hate messages in his postings by mistake seems very weak to me.

The evidence in this case of his [Richard Warman’s] participation on Internet sites similar to the Northern Alliance site is both disappointing and disturbing. It diminishes his credibility.”


In today’s decision, the Tribunal also left a nice parting shot on the CHRC.  Tribunal member Lustig used the CHRC’s own press release against them to stop enforcement of Section 13.



NO SURRENDER!
-Marc Lemire





------------------------------------
CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL  
TRIBUNAL CANADIEN DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE




Canadian Jewish Congress
Complainant
- and -
CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Commission
- and -
Henry Makow
Respondent
RULING
MEMBER: Edward P. Lustig
2010 CHRT 13
2010/05/26
 
[1] This is a ruling concerning a motion by the Respondent dated September 4, 2009 for an adjournment of this matter sine die.

[2] The complaint in this matter was filed by the Complainant on January 29, 2007. The complaint alleges that the Respondent communicated messages over the internet that were likely to expose members of the Jewish community to hatred or contempt by reason of their membership in an identifiable group contrary to s. 13 (1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act (the "CHRA"). The complaint alleges that the impugned conduct occurred in a manner that was ongoing.

[3] On September 16, 2008, the Commission, pursuant to s. 44 (3) (a) of CHRA requested the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (the "Tribunal") to institute an inquiry into the complaint.

[4] On September 2, 2009 the Tribunal released its decision in the matter of Warman v. Lemire, 2009 CHRT 26. That case involved a complaint under s. 13 (1) of the CHRA. In his very comprehensive decision, Member Hadjis concluded:

"... I have also concluded that s. 13 (1) in conjunction with ss. 54 (1) and (1.1) are inconsistent with s. 2 (b) of the Charter, which guarantees the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression. The restriction imposed by these provisions is not a reasonable limit within the meaning of s. 1 of the Charter."

[5] On October 1, 2009, the Commission applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in Warman v. Lemire (See FC file no. T-1640-09).

[6] In its public release commenting on its application for Judicial Review dated October 1, 2009, the Commission commented as follows:

"The Commission applied for Judicial Review so that technical but important legal issues raised by the decision can be clarified. These issues go beyond this particular case and could have an impact on other administrative tribunals. As a result, the uncertainty created by the decision is not in the public interest and merits a binding decision by a higher court.

The application is based on two grounds. It is the Commission's view that:

1. The Tribunal erred in law when it found that the manner by which the applicant exercises its statutory mandate could render section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act unconstitutional; and

2. The Tribunal's findings of unconstitutionality also resulted from the adoption of subsections 54 (1) (c) and (1.1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, subsequent to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892. The Tribunal erred in law when it refused to apply section 13 of the Act because a refusal to apply subsections 54 (1) (c) and (1.1) would have provided a sufficient remedy in respect of this ground."

[7] The parties filed with the Tribunal submissions with respect to the Respondent's motion for an adjournment. It is to be noted that the motion was filed prior to the Commission's application for Judicial Review in the Warman v. Lemire case.

[8] I have reviewed the submissions of the parties and have concluded that it would be appropriate and would properly serve the interests of justice if this matter was adjourned. While the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, 1990 3 S.C.R. 892 that s. 13 (1) of the CHRA is constitutional, the application now before the Federal Court seeks to bring clarity to this issue in view of the distinct factual and legal context giving rise to this Tribunal's decision in Warman v. Lemire. Clearly Member Hadjis' decision goes beyond the consideration alone of the penalty provisions in s. 54 of the CHRA, as he chose not to "read out" the penalty provisions and preserve s. 13 of the CHRA. It is now up to the Federal Court to determine the operability of s. 13 of the CHRA. This will achieve the clarity that the Commission has indicated and that I agree is desirable in order to allow the Tribunal to be able to determine this and other cases brought under s. 13 of the CHRA.

[9] For these reasons I hereby adjourn these proceedings sine die pending the final outcome in the Warman v. Lemire case.

"Signed by"
Edward P. Lustig
OTTAWA, Ontario
May 26, 2010


PARTIES OF RECORD


TRIBUNAL FILE:


T1330/6008
STYLE OF CAUSE:
Canadian Jewish Congress v. Henry Makow
RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED:
May 26, 2010
APPEARANCES:

Igor Ellyn
For the Complainant
Daniel Poulin / Sheila Osborne-Brown
For the Canadian Human Rights Commission
Barbara Kulaszka
For the Respondent
 


UPDATE:
The case against Authur Topham and the Radical Press has been adjourned Sine Die also.










Thursday, May 27, 2010

OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL - THE COURT: On the eve of change? Addressing hate speech in the Internet age at the Federal Court

 

Predicting the outcome of the appeal rests on a multitude of factors, as it is utterly impossible to ascertain which submission the Federal Court will find more convincing.  As for my opinion, I find Lemire’s submissions stronger, particularly as a result of his purposive approach to the issue at hand.

The Court - Osgoode Hall Law School

 

 

 

--------------------

 

 

 

 

About the staffTHE COURT is the online resource for debate & data about the Supreme Court of Canada.*

 

 

On the eve of change? Addressing hate speech in the Internet age at the Federal Court

http://www.thecourt.ca/2010/05/26/on-the-eve-of-change-addressing-hate-speech-in-the-internet-age-at-the-federal-court/

 

On January 22, 2010 the Canadian Human Rights Commission (“CHRC”) filed a memorandum (PDF link) with the Federal Court, appealing the decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (“CHRT”) in Warman v. Lemire2009 CHRT 26 (PDF link). The CHRT determined that the hate speech provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, H-6 (“CHRA”) were unconstitutional.  The memorandum claims then-Tribunal chairman Athanasios D. Hadjis erred in law when he determined that s. 13 of the CHRA violated s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – the guarantee of freedom of expression.  Undoubtedly, the appeal will encourage widespread debate on this volatile political issue.

Background

The CHRC, a quasi-judicial body drawing its power from the CHRA, is charged with the duty to promote, advocate and educate society with respect to human rights issues.  Section 13(1) of the CHRA states:

It is a discriminatory practice … to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking … any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt … on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

Further, ss. (2) of the CHRA states that hate speech which uses the Internet as the medium of communication also falls under s. 13.

The legislation came under fire when derogatory comments were made by third party users against homosexuals and blacks on FreedomSite.org, a website administered by Marc Lemire.  In 2003, activist Ottawa lawyer Richard Warman filed a complaint with the CHRC, alleging that postings pn Lemire’s website were capable of inciting hatred or contempt against the aforementioned minority groups and violated s. 13.

The Controversial Earlier Decision

In Warman v. Lemire2009 CHRT 26, the Tribunal determined that s. 13(1) was an unconstitutional infringement of s. 2(b). Lemire filed a motion requesting that ss. 13, 54(1) and 54(1.1) be declared unconstitutional, citing that the impugned provisions violated his s. 2(b) Charter guarantee of freedom of expression.  Section 54 outlines the punitive remedies available for a breach of s. 13. Chairman Hadjis addressed the s. 2(b) Charter claim extensively, and it was his decision in Warman that forms the basis for the appeal to the Federal Court.

The SCC had previously grappled with the issue of s. 13 in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892.  The majority decision, delivered by Dickson C.J.C., upheld the constitutionality of s. 13. He found that the infringement was justified. Chairman Hadjis held that circumstances had evolved since the Taylor decision and it was therefore necessary to revisit in the issue, especially in light of the 1998 amendment to the CHRA which added a remedial section.

54. (1) If a member or panel finds that a complaint related to a discriminatory practice described in section 13 is substantiated, the member or panel may make only one or more of the following orders:

(a) an order containing terms referred to in paragraph 53(2)(a);

(b) an order under subsection 53(3) to compensate a victim specifically identified in the communication that constituted the discriminatory practice; and

(c) an order to pay a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars.

Chairman Hadjis saw this amendment as fundamentally altering the statute from one remedial in nature to a punitive law.  As a result, Chairman Hadjis felt the minimal impairment requirement of the Oakes Test (established in R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103) no longer applied, and the impugned provisions could no longer be saved, thus rendering  s. 13 unconstitutional. For The Court’s in-depth analysis on the earlier decision, please refer to Warman v. Lemire: The Constitutionality of Hate Speech Legislation.

The Federal Court Appeal: The Two Positions

The CHRC’s severance approach

Both parties filed documentation outlining the arguments that will be made on appeal.  The CHRC’s memorandum first argues that the manner in which the CHRC pursues hate speech is unrelated and irrelevant to the constitutionality of the impugned hate speech law under s. 13.  This position stems from the fact that the Tribunal notably emphasized both: (a) the fact that the offensive material was removed by Lemire, and (b) that the CHRC and Warman jointly rebuffed efforts at conciliation and instead, pushed the case towards a tribunal hearing.  Implicitly, the CHRC suggests Chairman Hadjis’ views on alternative dispute resolution should not have been factored into his analysis of the law surrounding hate speech.  Secondly, the CHRC maintains that severance of the penalty provisions was the appropriate course of action with respect to s. 54 of the CHRA.

Finally, the CHRC submits that only the penalty provisions included in s. 54 be struck out.  At para. 33, the CHRC makes the argument that ss.  54(1)(a) and 53(2)(a) must be left intact, thereby providing the ability to apply a “cease and desist” order to hate speech.  Furthermore, at para. 34, the CHRC also suggests the Federal Court uphold s. 54 (1)(b), which allows for financial compensation for victims.

Mr. Lemire focuses on policy considerations

Lemire, in his memorandum (PDF link), believes that s. 13 is “outdated” in light of the advances made in Internet communications. Specifically, Lemire states that the purpose of s. 13 is irreconcilable with the current reality of expressive content.  As Dickson C.J.C. wrote in the majority decision in Taylor, telephone expression (which was the issue in that case) is particularly troublesome in the context of discriminatory statements as the method is:

one which gives the listener the impression of direct, personal, almost private, contact by the speaker, provides no realistic means of questioning the information or views presented and is subject to no counter-argument within that particular communications context.

According to Lemire, the Internet is distinguishable from the telephone in that the Internet allows for instantaneous response and subsequent discussion to offensive public material.  Unlike Taylor, which involved the use of automated phone messages, Lemire argues that his website does not restrict discussion or the ability to respond.

What Will The Outcome Be?

Predicting the outcome of the appeal rests on a multitude of factors, as it is utterly impossible to ascertain which submission the Federal Court will find more convincing.  As for my opinion, I find  Lemire’s submissions stronger, particularly as a result of his purposive approach to the issue at hand.

The purpose of s. 13 is well stated in a legislative summary of Bill S-5 (which added the punitive amendments in 1998).

The government believes that stronger measures are needed to deter individuals and organisations from establishing hate lines. It hopes to accomplish this by allowing victims of such lines to apply for compensation and subjecting offenders to financial penalty.

If a purposive approach is adopted, then it follows that establishing penalties is fundamentally tied to the method by which the government is attempting to quell hate speech.  As such, it is logical to classify the punitive provisions as the “pith and substance” of the impugned provision.  Therefore, severing the punitive provision in s. 54(1), as the CHRC would have done, would have the effect of nullifying the objective of the entire hate speech section. More importantly, the appeal will re-visit the importance Canadian society puts on the inviolable right to freedom of speech.  As written by McLachlin C.J.C. in Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61

Freedom of expression and respect for vigorous debate on matters of public interest have long been seen as fundamental to Canadian democracy. Many years before the Charter this Court, in the Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100, per Duff C.J., suggested that the Canadian Constitution contained an implied right of free expression on political matters.

Canadian jurisprudence has consistently emphasized the importance of freedom of expression, however offensive.  However, that does not mean there are no limits to freedom of expression.  Section 319(2) of the Criminal Code provides a punitive sentence of imprisonment for the willful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group.

In my opinion, the scope of s. 319(2) captures hate speech which is actually dangerous to society as a whole.  Section 319(2) does what it was intended to do – prohibit extreme forms of hate propaganda.

Section 13 of the CHRA is a grey area that does not clearly distinguish constitutional free speech and harmful hate speech.  The Federal Court could take this opportunity to clarify the state of the law on hate speech as it currently stands.

[filed: Charter of Rights and Freedoms Constitutional law Freedom of Speech]

 

 

Wednesday, May 26, 2010

Lemire Opposes the African-Canadian Legal Clinics Intervention to support Censorship

 

Lemire Opposes the African-Canadian Legal Clinics Intervention to support Censorship

 

 

On May 19, 2010 the National Post ran an article on the African-Canadian Legal Clinic (ACLC) intervention submissions to the Federal Court of Canada.

 

The ACLC supports censorship and the notorious internet censorship law – Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

 

The ACLC is a 100% tax-payer funded outfit, which surprisingly has a discriminatory membership policy.  If you’re not an “African-Canadian” you are not able to join the organization.  And they have the nerve to support censorship?

 

As an ultimate joke.  The ACLC’s lawyer is Ed Morgan, former head of the Canadian Jewish Congress.  While Mr. Morgan might be able to represent them in court, since he is Jewish, he is not actually able to join the organization with voting rights.

 

Welcome to politically correct Canada.  I guess some discrimination is ok – as long as it’s their discrimination.

 

Here are the reply submissions which my wonderful lawyer – Barbara Kulaszka – filed with the Federal Court of Canada earlier today.  It makes mincemeat of the “African-Canadian” supremacists and their absurd intervention application supporting censorship and the corrupt Canadian Human Rights Commission.

 

 

 

 

Court File No. T-1640-09

FEDERAL COURT

BETWEEN:

CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Applicant

 

-and-

 

RICHARD WARMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF Canada and

MARC LEMIRE

Respondents

 

-and-

BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

ASSOCIATION, LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF B'NAI BRITH CANADA,

CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS, and FRIENDS OF SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTRE

FOR HOLOCAUST STUDIES

Intervenors

 

 

 

 

MOTION RECORD

OF THE RESPONDENT MARC LEMIRE

(May 25, 2010)

 

 

 

1. The African Canadian Legal Clinic ("ACLC"), a government funded legal clinic which serves and represents the African Canadian community, has made a motion to the Court for leave to intervene in this judicial review application pursuant to Rule 109 of the Federal Courts Rules. 1998. The initial motion failed to set out any grounds for the application but an amended Notice of Motion was served by fax on May 20,2010.

 

2. The judicial review application was brought by the Canadian Human Rights Commission ("CHRC") after a decision by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal refusing to apply s. 13(1) and s. 54(1) and (1.1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act on the grounds that the provisions violated the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

 

3. The issues raised in the Notice of Application of the CHRC are as follows:

 

a. the Tribunal erred in law when it found that the manner by which the CHRC exercises its statutory mandate could render section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act unconstitutional;

 

b. the Tribunal erred in law when it refused to apply section 13 of the Act because a refusal to apply subsections 54( 1)(c) and (1.1) would have provided a sufficient remedy in respect of this ground. [Notice of Application, Appendix A]

 

4. In para. 1 of its Memorandum of Fact and Law, the CHRC conceded that the penalty provisions contained in s. 54(1) (c) and (1.1) of the Act are unconstitutional.

 

5. The respondent Marc Lemire disputes these points and argues that the decision was in any event correct based on other grounds before the Tribunal and that s. 13(1) cannot be saved even if the penalty provisions are severed.

 

 

PART II - POINTS IN ISSUE

 

6. Has the proposed intervener met the test for intervention within the Federal Courts Rules, Rule 109

 

 

PART III - ARGUMENT

 

7. Rule 109 provides as follows:

 

109.

(1) The Court may, on motion, grant leave to any person to intervene in a proceeding.

(2) Notice of a motion under subsection (1) shall

(a) set out the full name and address of the proposed intervener and of any solicitor acting for the proposed intervener; and

(b) describe how the proposed intervener wishes to participate in the proceeding and how that participation will assist the determination of afactual or legal issue related to the proceeding. [emphasis added]

 

8. The test for intervention under Rule 109 is set out in the case of Canadian Union of Public Employees (Airline Division) v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd., [2000] F.C.J. No. 220 at paras. 8 and 9 [see ACLC Motion Record, Vol. 1, Tab 4-C]:

 

1) Is the proposed intervener directly affected by the outcome?

2) Does there exist a justiciable issue and a veritable public interest?

3) Is there an apparent lack of any other reasonable or efficient means to submit the question of the Court?

4) Is the position of the proposed intervener adequately defended by one of the parties to the case?

5) Are the interests of justice better served by the intervention of the proposed third party?

6) Can the Court hear and decide the cause on its merits without the proposed intervener?

7) Has the proposed intervener shown in the application how the proposed intervention "will assist the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding" as required by para. 2 of Rule 109?

 

9. It is submitted that the ACLC has failed to show how its intervention will assist in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding as required by para. 2 of Rule 109 and as such its motion must fail. The onus is upon the ACLC to demonstrate that it has met the test for intervention. [Cupe, supra, para. 6]

 

10. Its proposed submissions, as set out in paras. 37 to 45 of its written submissions, do not relate to any issues in the judicial review. Instead, the ACLC provides only very vague and general proposed submissions relating to matters either not in issue or beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. It is submitted that these intended submissions completely fail to meet the requirements of Rule 109.

 

11. Examples are as follows:

 

a. The ACLC submits s. 13 should be preserved "albeit with some substantive and procedural modifications." (para. 37) These proposed modifications are not set out, nor is there any attempt to relate how this is relevant to the facts or legal issues raised in the judicial review. The onus is upon the ACLC to do so.

 

b. The ACLC proposes to make submissions on the need to preserve s. 13 with "recommendations on how the provision should be modified to align with the remedial focus of the Canadian Human Rights Act." (para. 38) The Court does not have jurisdiction to receive "recommendations" on the "modification" of legislation. Its jurisdiction is limited by s. 18.1(3) and (4) of the Federal Courts Act to determine legal and factual matters as set out therein.

 

c. The ACLC proposes to make submissions on the "inadequacy of the Criminal Code hate speech provision." (para. 40) The adequacy or inadequacy of the Criminal Code is not in issue in this judicial review.

 

d. The ACLC claims that the imposition of punitive sanctions under s. 13 engages s. 2(b) of the Charter and that "the issue at that point is whether these punitive measures are reasonable in a free and democratic society." (para. 42) In fact, there is no issue concerning this. The constitutionality of the punitive sanctions under s. 13, namely, s. 54(1) (c) and (1.1), are not in issue as the CHRC has conceded that the provisions are unconstitutional. In para. 1 of its Memorandum of Fact and Law, the CHRC stated that it "takes no issue with the Tribunal's refusal to apply the penalty clauses at sections 54(1)( c) and (1.1) of the CHRA on constitutional grounds." The issue before the Court is whether the doctrine of severability is applicable to save s. 13 by severing the penalty provisions. The ACLC has provided no arguments relevant to this issue.

 

e. The ACLC intends to make "submissions on suggested remedies and recommendations to ensure that s. 13 meets its civil remedial objective more effectively" such as "possibly .. .including internet service providers and others ... in the chain of delivery of the impugned communications." (paras. 44-45) Again, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited by s. 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act and unspecified "suggested remedies and recommendations" have no relevance to the determination of the factual and legal points in issue.

 

12. A judicial review is not a Royal Commission or Parliamentary Committee inquiry into the adequacy of laws against hate in Canada with a view to making amendments to the legislation. In those settings, "submissions on suggested remedies and recommendations to ensure that s. 13 meets its civil remedial objective more effectively" may be made to legislators but such submissions have no relevance to the legal issues to be decided in this judicial review application before the Court.

 

13. This Court has no power to preserve s. 13 "with some substantive and procedural modifications" as proposed by the ACLC. Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the decision of the Tribunal to determine whether it has acted contrary to law.

 

14. With respect to the constitutionality of the penalty provisions of s. 13, the ACLC is attempting to make submissions on a point of law that is not in issue in this application.

 

15. Because its intended submissions have no relevance to the legal or factual issues in the application, as required by Rule 109(2), it is submitted that the ACLC also fails to meet any of the other elements in the test set out in CUPE, supra.

 

PART IV - ORDER REQUESTED

 

16. The respondent Marc Lemire requests that the motion for intervention by the ACLC be dismissed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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I Desperately need your help to continue

Fighting the fanatics at the Canadian "Human Rights" Commission and defending freedom of speech for ALL Canadians is not an easy task. In particular, the Federal Court of Canada challenge has consumed a lot of time and resources. This has meant sacrificing a lot of cherished things in my life that I used to take for granted such as spending precious time with my children. It's also very costly and has incurred heavy debts given that I'm facing a "Human Rights" juggernaut that has a limitless budget. It has already spent millions and is prepared to spend a lot more of your tax dollars to keep their thought control machine running.

My courageous lawyer Barbara Kulaszka and myself have demonstrated what two dedicated researchers can accomplish against overwhelming odds. We have single-handedly and doggedly fought the System and exposed the corrupt underbelly of the "Human Rights" Commission's fanatics. Nothing ever comes easy when you are fighting such a racket. This case is a seminal one, where the outcome will have serious implications on our right to think and speak freely in this country for generations to come. All Canadians will benefit if we manage to get this shameful law expunged from our legal books.

Every victory we've attained against the "Human Rights" juggernaut has come at great expense. Nothing has come easy.  In fact, the “Human Rights” Commission has done everything in their power to stop exposure of their twisted censorship agenda.

We cannot carry on this important fight alone. Your donations literally equal the survival of this case.

I wish to thank all those that have donated to this worthy cause. Please donate directly to us so that I can send out a personal thank you. If you have donated to another organization or individual please contact me so I can thank you directly and send you a copy of our special booklet that is for our supporters only.

How you can help:

 

>> DONATE NOW to Marc Lemire’s Challenge:  Via PayPal <<

 

 

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Be part of our team and contribute what you can to defeat this horrible law 

and protect Freedom of Speech in Canada !

 

·         Via Mail: Send Cheque or Money Order to:

 

Marc Lemire

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M5A 2K1 

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It’s time to end the censorship of the extremist Canadian Human Rights Commission!

 

Stop Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act

 

http://www.StopSection13.com

http://www.freedomsite.org

http://blog.freedomsite.org

http://canadianhumanrightscommission.blogspot.com